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Examining 16th-century Kurdish politics, particularly in the frontier districts between the Ottoman 
and Safavid Empires, aptly serves as a starting point for understanding Kurdish regional semi-auton-
omy. This paper, dedicated to the activities of Kurdish individuals involved in information-gather-
ing on behalf of both the Ottoman and the Safavid Empires, is the first of its kind. The findings pre-
sented here are the result of close exploration in the Ottoman archives as well as detailed reading of 
a number of materials from Ottoman and Safavid chronicles. The paper discusses three main sub-
jects. The introductory section briefly explains the methods and potentials of Kurdish spying as well 
as some of the particulars of Ottoman–Safavid espionage. The second section provides an overview 
of two famous Kurdish intellectual historians and the role each played in information-gathering. 
The third section discusses cases of espionage throughout the political careers of several Kurdish 
frontier emirs. 
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I. Introduction  
Little is known about the control of information in the 16th century, but it must have 
been quite considerable, especially in the Middle East. In the political arena of the 
time, information played a significant role and gave a certain advantage to those  
 
 
* The authors would like to express their gratitude to Akihiko Yamaguchi and Rasul 
Jafariyan who read the first draft of this article. They are also grateful to Rudi Matthee, Nicole 
Beckmann, Wendelmoet Hamelink, Martin van Bruinessen, Welat Zeydanlioğlu, and Djene Rhys 
Bajalan, for their guidance and assistance throughout. Any remaining errors are our own respon-
sibility. 
 
 
198 MUSTAFA DEHQAN – VURAL GENÇ 
Acta Orient. Hung. 71, 2018 
empires that developed their policies based on information provided by accurate 
sources. In a battle with the logistical difficulties of the 16th century, empires had to 
make investment in espionage networks which, albeit incapable and simple by modern 
criterions, still provided them with the most reliable information according to which 
they were to distribute their resources and create their policies. As might be expected, 
empires sought to make use of and control information in order to get advantage over 
their rivals1. 
 Control of information is an important facet of 16th-century Ottoman–Safavid 
politics as well. The length and the scope of Ottoman–Safavid rivalry convinced both 
empires to establish some espionage networks that gathered information in a large 
frontier geography. Nevertheless, in the war of information between Ottomans and 
Safavids on their frontier territories, the success of both empires was essentially based 
on the Kurdish principalities and individuals. 
 The emergence of Safavid power – a special change in the eastern borders of 
the Ottoman Empire – introduced to keep a close eye on the military progress, tribal 
movements, and economic capability of the new Shiite rivals. At the very beginning 
of the 16th century the Safavids appeared on the political scene of the region with a 
new set of religious claims. Besides the very harsh religious answer that Safavids re-
ceived from the Ottomans, another result was that Ottoman sensitivity became stronger 
than had originally been planned. Without a doubt, espionage made a significant mark 
on the Ottoman–Safavid relations since the beginning of this longstanding conflict. 
Initially, both empires relied by necessity on Kurdish espionage networks. The lack 
of information readily available to the Ottomans on Ismā‘īl I, for example, obliged 
them to gather information on Safavid activities much beyond the Euphrates (see 
Walsh 1962, p. 206). 
 In the 16th century, there was no assured way of effectively controlling Kurd-
ish frontier tribes. Espionage was also the quickest way by which the Ottomans and 
Safavids could improve their situation in Kurdistan. In accordance with their “intelli-
gence strategy”, Ottomans and Safavids engaged in a number of different activities 
such as information analysis, disinformation, bribery, propaganda, cryptanalysis, and 
counter-intelligence (see Gürkan 2012a). 
 No effort was made to analyse Kurdish spies and informants in the 16th cen-
tury. The sources for the Ottoman and Safavid spies are hardly accessible even today. 
In his informative and invaluable PhD dissertation, Emrah Safa Gürkan made a ma-
jor contribution especially to the study of Ottoman espionage on the western Otto-
man frontiers (see Gürkan 2012b). No mention was, however, made about the Kurdish 
spies in the 16th century. The inclusion of the Safavid espionage is also very brief and 
superficial. On the subject of spies in the Safavid Empire, other than the spies and in-
formants acted on the Ottoman frontier, our main source of information is the article 
by Vural Genç (forthcoming). The following pages aim to supplement these past re-
searches and especially to make an important contribution to the neglected subject of 
Kurdish information-gathering. The potential to act as brokers of information was a 
 
1 For details, see Skilliter (1976, pp. 47–59).  
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source of Kurdish power and leverage, allowing them to exchange one patron for an-
other. What we are dealing with here is also this strategic position of Kurdish frontier 
emirates as an excellent factor for negotiating with neighbouring empires.  
II. Methods and Potentials of Kurdish Espionage  
Specific terms are used in both Ottoman and Safavid documents to refer to and de-
scribe spies and information-gathering. The technical term for espionage in both Sa-
favid and Ottoman texts is either the Persian zabāngīrī or the Turkish dil almak, the 
literal translation of which is ‘catching a tongue’.2 The most ubiquitous term, how-
ever, is jāsūsī or tecessüs. The term rasm-i zabāngīrī should also be mentioned.  
It can be translated as either ‘espionage method’ or ‘espionage fashion’ (see Turka-
mān 2008, Vol. I, p. 509). While literature on espionage has alluded to uses of words 
like rasm-i zabāngīrī, the subject of terminology has received neither any detailed, 
nor even clear methodological attention. 
 It is true that the 16th-century authors rarely identify a specifically Kurdish ap-
proach to espionage, which is distinguishable from a characteristically Ottoman or 
Safavid approach. The standard understanding of Kurdish espionage is possibly hin-
dered by a lack of understanding of what the term Kurdish spy may have referred to 
in the 16th century.  
 Non-Kurdish Safavid and Ottoman spies were probably considered more trust-
worthy because, unlike their Kurdish counterparts who had close ties with Kurdish 
emirs whose loyalty was extremely fluid, they did not have potentially competing loy-
alties. The forms in which the Kurdish spies appeared were many and varied. They 
normally came into imperial service as (i) frontier tribal agents, (ii) envoys, (iii) pil-
grims, (iv) travellers, and (v) merchants. Often pursued by imperial authorities, they 
normally travelled in disguise (tebdîl-i sûret). 
 Influential Kurdish emirs and intellectuals were particularly interested in infor-
mation-gathering. These emirs and their principalities were home to many tribal chief-
tains and local merchants, pilgrims, and agents that crossed the Ottoman–Safavid 
boundary regularly. For the imperial authorities, having a Kurdish emir in their ser-
vice meant that they had widespread access to hundreds of tribal men, chieftains, and 
equipment.  
 Broader regional interests often influenced Kurdish interactions with both the 
Ottomans and the Safavids. The fact that Kurdish emirs had Kurdish allies on either 
 
2 In both Ottoman and Safavid traditions, the word jāsūs (sometimes as ādam) is often used 
to denote ‘spy, informant’. Common Persian and Arabic words (mukhbir, ṣāḥib al-khabar, munahhī, 
mushrif) are not included. Interestingly, the Turkish word dil ‘tongue’ was occasionally used as a 
synonym for jāsūs. Compare Ispanaqchīpāshāzāda (2000, p. 177) and Ibn Manẓūr (1986, Vol. II,  
p. 283). To our knowledge, Kurdish nouns and verbs for espionage (e.g. destkîs, sîxur, cehş, cesis-
andin, and qişirandin) were not mentioned in any Ottoman–Safavid or Kurdish texts from the 16th 
century.  
 
200 MUSTAFA DEHQAN – VURAL GENÇ 
Acta Orient. Hung. 71, 2018 
side of the border proved to challenging for the imperial powers.3 Although no de-
tailed account to this effect has been found to date, they seemed to have been very 
capable of simultaneously serving as spies for both powers without their duplicity 
being discovered.  
 Kurdish emirs sometimes even learned to be spies before they learned to be 
emirs. According to the archival reports, it is clear that spies of Kurdish emirs had 
connections to both the Sultan, and especially, the Shah. This provided them the op-
portunity to gather information from the centre unimpeded. It should be kept in mind, 
however, that Kurdish actions toward either empire could have been only a small part 
of a larger espionage project. A key to successful spying in the 16th century was to 
have an advantage in the politics of information. Kurdish espionage was not the only 
answer to the major queries that Ottoman–Safavid espionage engagement needed to 
ask. Kurdish emirs who co-operated with their Ottoman and Safavid overlords were 
strategic actors. As such, they sought to take advantage of political position on the 
frontier in order to achieve their personal objectives. This does not mean, however, 
that their objectives were predetermined by their Kurdishness. Additionally, the fact 
that Kurds provided services to both the Ottomans and the Safavids should not be 
considered treachery. It would be anachronistic to apply the concepts of nationhood 
and nationalism to the 16th century. 
A. Kurdish Espionage and Bilingualism 
The characteristics that set Kurdish spies apart from Ottoman and Safavid spies are 
their bilingualism and their frontier tribal affiliations.4 A substantial debate in Islamic 
sources on the capability of spies, emphasises the provision that the spy have excel-
lent knowledge of the enemy’s language which was the rival empire (see Qalqashandī 
1963, Vol. I, p. 124). This helps explain why Ottomans and Safavids gave priority to 
Kurdish-speaking people in frontier areas. Throughout the 16th century, this attention 
to linguistic capabilities retained its priority for imperial agents seeking to employ 
spies (see Olearius 1984, p. 200). The geographical landscape of Kurdistan, being a 
mountainous borderland, explains both the preservation of the Kurdish language and 
the populations’ practice of speaking neighbouring languages as well. This linguistic 
competence, also a contemporary characteristic of Kurdish populations, is likely to 
have made them quite attractive assets to both Ottoman and Safavid officials. 
 
3 Some aspects of this capability were generally regarded as a ‘problem’ within the espio-
nage duties. In his Sīyāsat-nāma, Khwāja Niẓām al-Mulk provides an ethical advice for the spies, 
encouraging them to be only the agents of the sultan and not the agents of others. See Niẓām al-
Mulk Ṭūsī (2003, pp. 74–75). 
4 Both at the Ottoman and the Safavid courts, Turkish was spoken, though there were dia-
lectal differences. It should be mentioned that knowledge of the Turkish language might have been 
more important for the espionage activities in the Ottoman–Safavid frontiers, but the capabilities of 
the Kurdish bilingual spies cannot be denied. 
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 A good sample of Kurdish bilingualism and the role it played in information-
gathering comes from the manuscript of the Persian collection of Jāmī’s Ash‘at al-
Luma‘āt, kept at the Majlis parliamentary collections in Tehran (see Jāmī n.d., fols 
77r–78r). It is an undated copy of an espionage letter addressed to Süleymân I. Based 
on the context and the reference to Sulṭān Ḥusayn Bayg, the Kurdish emir of ‘Amā-
dīyya, it is certain that the unnamed spy in question was himself originally from Kur-
distan who gathered information as an intermediary between Safavids and Sulṭān 
Ḥusayn Bayg5. It should be noted that the object of this letter is to investigate the po-
litical status of Safavids via the Safavid ḥajj caravan which was under the command 
of a pro-Safavid Kurd, that is Ḥājjī Bayg Dunbulī6, a symbol of Safavid power in 
some parts of Ādharbāyjān where there were some linguistic and religious differ-
ences from the western Ottoman regions. It is wise to accept that the Kurdish spy in 
question had safer ways of communicating with the Kurdish-Safavid ṣāḥib ḥajj as he 
was able to speak Kurdish, Ottoman Turkish, and the Turkish dialect of Ādharbāyjān.  
B. Kurdish Espionage and Religion  
The frontier areas between the Ottoman and Safavid Empires were permeable, con-
tributing to a rather fluid religious landscape.7 There is reason to assume, however, 
that religion played only a secondary role in the development of Kurdish espionage. 
A remarkable feature of the subject is the very large number of references to the term 
tajassus. As was mentioned above, Kurdish espionage was most often called tecessüs 
etmek or tecessüs, both of which bring to mind the Arabic legal term tajassus. Might 
the term be connected with Islamic fiqh? Despite the fact that both Sunnis and Shiites 
strongly objected to intra-family espionage (‘awrāt), both communities ardently en-
couraged spying on the secret plans of rival countries and enemies (see, for example, 
Warrām n.d., Vol. I, p. 115; Kharshī 1997, Vol. IV, p. 28; Majlisī 1983, Vol. 64, pp. 
312–313). It is interesting to note, however, that only the Shāfi‘ite school (that of the 
Sunni Kurds) traditionally advocated tolerance toward captured spies, stating the need 
to refrain from making rushed judgements about them (see Anonymous 1986, Vol. X,  
p. 166). The inclusion of the term düşmen-i bi-din ‘irreligious enemy’ in reference to 
Iran (see, for example, BOA MD 38, khm. 376, dated 7 Jumādā II 987/1 August 1579) 
emphasised a religious role similar to the military one played by the active spies as 
 
5 The demise of Sulṭān Ḥusayn Bayg must date from shortly before 979/1571–1572 when 
Muṣliḥ al-Dīn Muḥammad Lārī (d. 979/1571–1572) had dispatched a letter to Sulṭān Ḥusayn Bayg, 
here known as the ruler of ‘Amādīyya in Mosul (al-marḥūm al-maghfūr lahu sulālatu al-umarā’i 
Sulṭān Ḥusayn ḥākimu al-‘Amādīyya bi-Mawṣili). See Lārī (2014, Vol. II, pp. 965–966); compare 
also KK 1764, 111; Scheref (1860, Vol. I, pp. 276–278, 284–285).  
6 Very possibly this Dunbulī ṣāḥib ḥajj is Ḥājjī Bayg b. Ḥājjī Bayg. During the revolt of 
Bâyezîd (966/1559–969/1562) Ṭahmāsp I appointed Ḥājjī Bayg as the governor of Abaghāy where 
he governed for about twenty years. See Scheref (1860, I, pp. 312, 314–315). 
7 For more details on the role of the religious element in the wars between the Ottomans 
and Safavids, see Matthee (2014, p. 19), and the references there. 
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Zaynal Bayg. It is interesting that the spying activities of the Kurdish emir are con-
sidered a religious matter. 
 The role that religious interests played in Kurdish espionage can even be at-
tributed to a stronger sense of identity among the Safavids than among the Ottomans. 
With the rise of the Safavids and the propagation of the Shiite doctrine in Anatolia, 
the Ottomans were forced to be active in opposing the spread of Shiism in Anatolian 
districts. While there is no evidence that Kurds of a specific branch of Islam spied for 
the Safavids, information-gathering was a key target in the activities of Anatolian Sa-
favid halîfes, who may well have been in contact with the Alevi Kurdish communi-
ties inhabiting the area (see BOA MD 23, Nos 173, 186, 451, 452, 696, all date from 
985/1577–1578). 
 The political engagement of Qubād Bayg of Kalhur, who controlled a vast area 
within Ottoman domains stretching from Dīnawar to Baghdad, can be related to reli-
gious espionage as well. It is certain that Qubād Bayg played a role in the spread of 
Shiism. Ottomans periodically conducted searches for kizilbaş heterodox practitioners 
within the frontier lands. According to the investigations of Baghdad’s governor in 
985/1577, the number of “heretic Shiites” in the province was extreme. This report 
shows that they found their leadership in the bey of the frontier sancak of Derne, i.e. 
Qubād Bayg, son of Mīr ‘Umar (see BOA MD 31, khm. 141; MD 32, khm. 416, 
418). He had prevented the passage of merchants between Iran and Baghdad and kept 
in touch with Iran via his spies. The governor of Baghdad once tried to imprison him, 
and encouraged the court to appoint a Sunni in his stead (see BOA MD 31, khm. 141).8 
 It is also important to mention ‘Umar Bayg of Kalhur, the supreme commander 
of the allied Kalhur and the governor of Daratañg and Darna. According to Ottoman 
documents, he held a position in 979/1571, especially because of the active espio-
nage affairs in which he was involved. Because of the Kalhur’s Shiite trends, it is 
probable that some espionage effort of ‘Umar Bayg has possibly gone into defending 
the Shiite Safavid Empire as well. A much more important witness is his position as a 
spy for the Ottomans in 979/1571 (see BOA MD 6, 187; MD 12, khm. 806; MD 30, 
khm. 247; MD 31, khm. 141, 777; MD 43 khm. 495; and Turkamān 2008, Vol. II,  
p. 650). 
C. Strategic Position and Kurdish Espionage  
The Ottoman and Safavid Empires came into contact with one another in the Kurdish 
localities around the frontier. Their conflict was a demonstration for all, layman and 
expert alike, of the strategic significance and importance of every piece of land in 
every corner of the frontier. Who had heard of the Kurdish villages on the frontier? 
Who was at all interested in the tribal life of the frontier? Obscure settlements on the 
Ādharbāyjān border, villages and towns on the eastern shores of Lake Vān, roads in 
 
8 Given the harsh Ottoman statements denouncing him, he may be considered one of the 
Kurdish spies who was more consistently allied with the Safavids. See also Turkamān (2008, Vol. II, 
pp. 650, 660).  
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Kurdish territories – suddenly these became almost daily topics in the imperial news 
and the people of the area learned their importance and the particular reasons for 
their prominence.9 
 Because of its strategic importance as a frontier area, the Ottoman and Safavid 
emperors usually refrained from direct interfering in the military and political life of 
Kurdistan, an inaccessible mountainous region, which remained a stronghold of semi-
independent trends. All of these geopolitical benefits have resulted in the establish-
ment of the espionage networks in which Kurds played the basic role. Their strategic 
importance on the frontier meant that Kurdish emirs were in a mountainous position 
to avoid declaring loyalty to either of the imperial authorities, and that they had an 
edge over spies sent from the imperial capitals.  
 In an effort to subdue and stabilise these frontier areas, both empires sought to 
establish fortresses there which were to serve as both military and regional diplomatic 
centres. Baghdad, Shahrizur, Vān, Erzurum, Tabrīz, and the local networks under the 
direction of Kurdish emirs there, were the main espionage tools of the Ottoman Em-
pire. The Ottomans had adopted a more active policy of maintaining an imperial 
presence in the frontier areas, where the local communities often switched their alle-
giance from one power to the other. The Safavids similarly sought to turn Kurdish 
emirs and their networks into imperial assets, with the difference that the Safavid side 
was relatively weak.10 Nevertheless, in both cases, imperial gifts and bribes paid to 
the influential Kurds of the area were an essential factor (see, for example, BOA MD 
38, khm. 376). 
III. Ottoman and Safavid Interests in Kurdish Espionage 
Kurdish spies were able to change their lords at will, as no Kurdish spy was related 
to any particular lord. While this was a basic phenomenon for espionage worldwide, 
it should be considered an especially important aspect of Kurdish spying activities. 
Imperial authorities exerted no direct control over Kurdish spies living in high moun-
tains in inaccessible frontier principalities. The imperial powers gained access to the 
world of Kurdish spies first by luring Kurdish emirs into their service. It is interesting, 
 
19 The strategic position of Kurdistan and the Ottoman policies towards the Kurds have been 
several times discussed in the secondary literature. See Bruinessen (1988, pp. 29–44); Murphey 
(2003, pp. 151–170); and Özoğlu (1996, pp. 5–27). For Ottoman–Safavid relations and the Kurdish 
tribes with a primary focus on the Safavid policy, see Nūrī – Nūrī (2011, pp. 272–281); and espe-
cially Yamaguchi (2012, pp. 101–132). 
10 By weak, we mean that the Safavids were less successful in recruiting Kurdish spies than 
the Ottomans. The Anatolian Shiite communities must have strong espionage service skills and a 
good potential for Safavid interests. While Sunnism makes Kurds the focus of Ottomans, the Ana-
tolian Shiism apparently act as a primary focus for the Safavids. See Allouche (1980, pp. 252–253) 
which is based on TSMA E. 5460. A letter from Ismā‘īl I to Mūsā Ṭūrghūd Oğlu, dated 7 Rabī‘ I 
918/23 May 1512, is presented here. In this letter, Ismā‘īl I requests the leader of the Ṭūrghūd tribe 
to contact the Safavid envoy to Anatolia, Aḥmad Āghā Qaramānlū, and to report in detail all impor-
tant activities in the area.  
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however, that with the many problems that the Ottomans and Safavids had at any 
given time, they were consistently interested in Kurdish espionage. It appears that the 
reason imperial authorities tolerated a degree of fluidity in their relationship with 
Kurdish spies was because of their perceived value. Some samples of Ottoman–Safa-
vid interests in Kurdish espionage may be somewhat helpful as we have very scanty 
evidence of involvement in such hidden activities.  
 First of all, we should remember that Kurdish espionage was most active 
during the reigns of Ṭahmāsp I (919/1515–984/1576) and Süleymân I (r. 926/1520–
974/1566). What role did they play in the events that led to the division of Kurdistan 
between Safavid and Ottoman lands? What role did they play prior to the reign of 
these two Sultans? Though espionage is a very important example of a political 
method forming part of the rivalries between Ismā‘īl I (892/1487–930/1524) and Bâ-
yezîd II (886/1481–918/1512), the same broad approach cannot be easily applied to 
the Kurdish emirs and their spying activities in the very early years of the century.  
A. Ottoman Officials Involved in Espionage  
The earliest Ottoman example known so far is the well-known Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa. 
After the battle of Chāldirān, Selîm I entrusted the conquest of Bāyburd and Kamākh 
to Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa (920/1514 and 921/1515) who played an important role in 
regional espionage. The regional positions that he held helped him shape an active 
espionage network in the Kurdish principalities of Dīyār Bakr (see TSMA E. 6102, 
E. 6627, E. 8283; Ebû-l-Faẓl n.d., fols 23r ff.; Rūmlū 2005, Vol. II, pp. 1097–1099; 
Bacqué-Grammont 1992, pp. 703–725).  
 Hüsrev Paşa (d. 951/1544), the ruler of Dīyār Bakr, is another well-known Ot-
toman military commander who was engaged in spying activities. According to the 
intelligence report kept at Topkapı Palace archives, some active Kurdish spies were 
the employees of Hüsrev Paşa. He had explicitly ordered Kurdish emirs to dispatch 
trustworthy spies to Persia. At the end of an undated letter he mentions that if the spies 
of Kurdish emirs had returned from Persia, he would be able to send an accurate re-
port to the court (see TSMA E. 7115).  
B. Mamlūk and Safavid Governors Involved in Espionage 
An interesting example is that of a Mamlūk case. Māmāy Bayg, the Mamlūk governor 
of Malatya, was spying for the Ottomans. On 3 Ramaḍān 918/21 November 1512, 
Māmāy Bayg had sent two spies to Persia in order to gather new information on 
Ismā‘īl I, particularly his military condition. The spies that Māmāy Bayg sent to cen-
tral Persia could travel from Mamlūk territory to Persia only because they were ac-
companied by a Persian çavuş. It seems that the possibility of enemy agents’ pene-
tration to their lands agitated Safavids and convinced them to check their Mamlūk 
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border rather than the Ottoman border (see TSMA E. 8758; Scheref 1860, Vol. I, pp. 
166–167; Bacqué-Grammont 1987, p. 39, note 67 and p. 42, note 68).  
 Safavid governors would sometimes exert a greater influence on the issue if 
they were considered in a special way. For instance, Amīr Khān Turkamān, the amīr 
al-umarā of Ādharbāyjān, played a significant role in matters of espionage. In the 
Sharaf-nāma, there is no clear reference to the role he played, but the extant evidence 
may still be helpful in determining his role in the Kurdish principalities of Salmās, 
Khuy, and Urmīya. What is given in the Turkish registers, on the other hand, may very 
easily direct us to his espionage services on behalf of the Ottomans. He was jailed 
and put to death by Shah Muḥammad Khudābanda in 992/1584, perhaps another sign 
of his unclear loyalties (see BOA MD 32, khm. 389, 507; MD 36, khm. 310; Selânikî 
1999, Vol. I, pp. 118–120; Scheref 1860, Vol. I, pp. 112, 314, 332–333; Vol. II, p. 273).  
IV. Circumspect Forefathers: Another Look  
In the heartlands of Kurdistan there lived, aside from the aristocracy and the peasant 
population of different origins and status, a “higher class” consisting of people whose 
special knowledge, skill and services could not easily be dispensed with in the impe-
rial states. These were artists and historians and other “personnel” whose spying ac-
tivities were somewhat unclear. The most important of these figures are Idrīs Bidlīsī 
and Sharaf Khān. 
 Both spent several years of their lives in Tabrīz, Qazwīn, and Istanbul. They 
also both penned Ottoman and Persian histories. They interacted with local as well as 
regional powers, and were thoroughly bilingual or even trilingual. Due to their family 
and religious backgrounds, Kurdish emirs and intellectuals typically spoke of them 
with great respect. Their visits to the Sultan or Shah and the access they had to the 
influential officials were sources of acceptance in the Kurdish community.  
 No explicit espionage enterprise is referenced in the lives and works of the 
Kurdish forefathers. It is possible that as intellectual elites, they chose to exclude 
mention of prevailing political trends in their historical studies. Any open declaration 
of one’s espionage confessions would likely have proved dangerous in the context of 
a changing political and religious society. Perhaps they wisely preferred to remain 
anonymous, concealing their spying activities behind other roles. 
A. Idrīs Bidlīsī 
Idrīs is undoubtedly one of the most important intellectual figures in the 15th- and 
16th-century Ottoman–Safavid world. It is certain that he established an espionage 
network to get information from the Safavids and their allies. In 920/1514, he accom-
panied the Ottoman Sultan on the Chāldirān campaign. According to the Sharaf-
nāma, some twenty Kurdish emirs had already sent declarations of their submission 
to Selîm I before his campaign against the Safavids. According to Sharaf Khān, Idrīs 
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was responsible for obtaining these declarations (see Scheref 1860, Vol. I, pp. 132, 
342–343, 415–416)  
 Idrīs did not leave Tabrīz in the autumn of 1514. As a privileged deputy of the 
Sultan, he stayed in Tabrīz. From Tabrīz he went to Urmīya where he tried to get local 
Kurdish emirs who had suffered violence at the hands of the Shah, to switch their al-
legiance from the Safavids to the Ottoman Sultan (see Genç 2015, pp. 43–75). Fol-
lowing the conquest of Āmid, the Ottoman Sultan, in a remarkable demonstration of 
his trust in Idrīs, sent him farmâns of investiture with the spaces left blank for him to 
fill in the names of the Kurdish recipients (see Ebû-l-Faẓl(n.d., passim, esp. fols 24r–
24v; TSMA E. 3165, 5675, 6627; 8333; Hoca Se‘dü-ddîn 1862, pp. 308–309; Ham-
mer 1827–1835, Vol. I, p. 749; Vol. II, pp. 432–434). 
 Having no military or administrative rank within the Ottoman administration, 
nevertheless, Idrīs continued to bring more Kurds into the Ottoman fold until Rabī‘ I 
922/April 1516. This voluntary mission included the crucial task of delivering Safavid 
intelligence to Selîm I. It is clear that the Persian reports that he forwarded to the Sul-
tan a number of strategic accounts that responded to the queries of Selîm I. Prior to 
the conquest of Dīyār Bakr, for instance, one of his spies reported that the Safavid 
army was very weak at the time, having only fifteen equipped camels that they moved 
from Tabrīz to Ūjān. In the same report, the spy indicated that troop numbers were 
around 7000 men who had no military equipment (see TSMA E. 1019).  
 After the conquest of Dīyār Bakr, Idrīs continued his spying activities. A Kurd-
ish spy, who was the employee of Idrīs in Tabrīz, Urmīya and Brādōst, reported that 
Ismā‘īl I was at the Eşkenber-Kelember summer pasture. According to this espionage 
report, the Shah had decided to march to Dīyār Bakr. For this purpose, he had dis-
patched one of his well-known commanders, named Dīv ‘Alī, to Chuqūr-i Sa‘d. 
Idrīs’s spy also mentioned that if the Sultan had reached that area, the Shah would 
evacuate all tribes from Chuqūr-i Sa‘d to Qarabāgh, Ganja and Barda‘ in order to pre-
vent the Ottoman army from being able to stay until the spring (see TSMA E. 8333/1; 
TSMA E. 6610; TSMA E. 8333/2; TSMA E. 1019). It should also be noted that Idrīs 
sometimes delivered informative letters to the Ottoman court via his attendants 
Mevlana Mehmed Türkistanî and Yusuf Ağa (see TSMA E. 8333/3; TSMA E. 1019).  
B. Sharaf Khān 
Under Ṭahmāsp I, Ismā‘īl II, and Khudābanda, Sharaf Khān was engaged in several 
Safavid political affairs in Gīlān, Shīrwān and Nakhchiwān. The Ottomans succeeded 
in bringing him into their fold. After a meeting with the Ottoman general Hüsrev Paşa 
in 986/1578, Murād III installed Sharaf Khān as ruler of Bidlīs which his ancestors 
had previously ruled (see KK 262, 181; MD 32, khm. 543, dated 27 Dhū al-Qa‘da 
986/3 February 1579).  
 Sharaf Khān’s changing political allegiances merit attention. His biography 
resembles that of Idrīs, as both were born in Iran, had contacts with contemporary 
Safavid rulers, and acquired a detailed knowledge of both the Iranian and the Kurdish 
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tribes of the Safavid Empire. Sharaf Khān’s broad and varied knowledge of the Safa-
vid government was one of the primary reasons that the Ottomans sought his ser-
vices. We do not know, however, to what degree Sharaf Khān was sympathetic to 
either the Safavids or the Ottomans.  
 The Ottoman archive includes some correspondence with the provinces and 
statesmen on matters concerning Sharaf Khān and the Ŗōzhiki tribe. Of note is the 
favourable attitude of the Ottomans towards Sharaf Khān’s tribe. The correspondence 
also reveals the Ottomans’ intention to make Sharaf Khān and his obedient followers 
available to the Ottomans (see BOA A.DVN.MHM 32, No. 168, dated Muḥarram 
986/April 1578; A.DVN.MHM 32, No. 556, dated 6 Dhī al-Ḥijja 986/12 February 
1579; and A.DVN.MHM 38, No. 195, dated 23 Ṣafar 987/30 April 1579). In order to 
maintain Sharaf Khān’s loyalty, the Ottomans established contacts with his friends, 
and installed him as governor of Bidlīs, where he would have influence over these 
friends. These friends provided general information on the political situation in Per-
sian Kurdistan, the diplomats in Vān and Tabrīz, and many Ŗōzhikī officials and spies 
interested in the glory of the Ottomans. 
 Espionage had a past in Sharaf Khān’s family. An interesting piece of evidence, 
for example, is a letter of Sharaf Khān, the grandfather of Sharaf-nāma’s author, to 
Bıyıqlı Mehmed Paşa in which he has provided detailed information on Ismā‘īl I’s 
campaign to Shīrwān and Nakhchiwān (see Bacqué-Grammont 1992, p. 709, based 
on TSMA E. 5858). The spy of Bidlīs’s Kurdish emir was interestingly among the 
very close companions of Ismā‘īl I. The main point here, however, is that it was his 
ancestors’ participation in espionage that made such affairs familiar to Sharaf Khān. 
 There is evidence that reflects the familiarity of Sharaf Khān with Kurdish 
espionage, though he himself, according to those same documents, was sufficiently 
aware of the riskiness of such activities (see BOA MAD, 17951, dated 20 Dhī al-
Ḥijja 988/4 February 1581). Upon the death of Amīr Shams al-Dīn, his father, Sharaf 
Khān found himself master of a tribal community that included many agents along 
both sides of the contested Ottoman–Safavid boundary. Very possibly there was no 
extensive personal spying activity; the body of roles played by the cautious Sharaf 
Khān should be related to a large network of Ŗōzhikī spies whose responsibility was 
to gather information for him. From the style and phrases used in BOA MD 48,  
No. 311 (written on 15 Ramaḍān 990/3 October 1582), it is clear that Sharaf Khān 
himself had close espionage relations with representatives of the Ottoman Empire.  
If Sharaf Khān was responsible for advising the governor of Vān in his spying activi-
ties, then it is likely that he also lead a Kurdish network of spies, which were beyond 
the access of persons like Vān’s governor. 
 The Sultan ordered the governor of Vān to use his spies and to write letters to 
other possible pro-Ottoman Kurdish officials in order to include them as part of the 
Ottoman side. What is mainly reflected is the idea that the Kurdish emirs (as Sharaf 
Khān) played a great role in information-gathering for Ottoman representatives in the 
area who themselves had no access to the local persons and equipment. Here the in-
vocation is neither directly to the Turkish spies nor to the Kurdish spies, but to the 
Kurdish emirs as consultants. It is interesting that Sharaf Khān is named between 
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Zaynal Bayg of Ḥakkārī and Ḥasan Bayg of Maḥmūdī whose role in the Kurdish spy-
ing activities is certain.  
V. Forthright Emirs: Making Friends by Having Enemies  
Idrīs and Sharaf Khān were unique in many respects. Savvy thinking may explain 
why it is difficult to determine the extent to which they participated in spying activi-
ties. Due to the secret nature of spying activities, it is difficult to describe them with 
certainty, although certain Kurdish spies of somewhat lower classes might be men-
tioned. Several emirs can be seen as contributors to espionage, some of which held 
no dynastic label. For example, one may take the mention of the Kurdish emir Şevket 
Bayg (whose name is not mentioned in the Sharaf-nāma). On 10 Muḥarram 942/20 
July 1535, Süleymân I executed him and his retinue during his second visit to Tabrīz 
for spying for the Safavids (see Ferîdûn Beg 1858, Vol. I, p. 595).  
 There are some completely unknown Kurdish spies who were experienced 
agents not only in the Ottoman–Safavid frontiers, but also in other districts of both 
empires. For example, the Kurds also played a very active role in Safavid spying ac-
tivities at the northeastern frontiers of Iran. In 991/1583, some Kurds were dispatched 
to regions around Tāybād (near the Afghanistan border) in order to make zabāngīrī 
(see Qumī 1980, Vol. II, p. 737). 
 Closer frontier areas for Ottoman–Safavid relations were more important, as 
espionage by these principalities were much safer than by much internal regions. 
Ḍīyā’ al-Dīn Bayg of Bidlīs, a son of Sharaf Khān, is a good sample of a Kurdish spy 
who heightened such a role of Kurdish principalities (see MD 78, khm. 1227, dated 
1018/1609–1610). There was a limited distance over which Kurdish peasants were 
willing to transport livestock and grain by road to the other side of the frontier, and 
this created a common structure in which each Kurdish district was a local centre for 
making possibilities to gather information. Some Ottoman documents contain instruc-
tions about transporting livestock and grain to Iran. The fact that such frontier com-
munications gave rise to Safavid spying activities indicates that the influence of fron-
tier Kurds was far beyond the area of their habitation (see MD 44, khm. 298; Koca 
Nişancı 1981, p. 451a).  
 There are also a considerable number of written letters to the unnamed Kurdish 
emirs of Erciş, Namran, Müküs, and Gargar, requesting that they spy on Safavid ter-
ritories. The formula bir sureti ‘a copy’ normally indicates those documents which 
have been sent to a group of Kurdish emirs especially including the secondary fron-
tier emirs (see, for example, MD 32, khm. 67; MD 38, khm. 376).  
 Exceptions to these unidentified and less known Kurdish spies are emirs men-
tioned in the Sharaf-nāma. A very interesting example is given in the Ḥakkārī chapter. 
Accordingly, two brothers from the principality were involved in espionage, one for 
the Ottomans, and the other for the Safavids (see Scheref 1860, Vol. I, pp. 101–102). 
Although Bāyindir Bayg of Ḥakkārī sought asylum at the court of Ṭahmāsp I, the 
latter entertained no friendly relationship with him as an official Kurdish emir. From 
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the following paragraphs in which this name is mentioned one may conclude that 
Ṭahmāsp I wished to use him in his frontiers rather than at the court. When Zaynal 
Bayg, as an Ottoman agent, was dispatched to the Safavid borders in order to gather 
information, his brother Bāyindir Bayg was involved in the Shah’s corresponding es-
pionage mission. This is a very important example which indicates that the secret 
knowledge the Kurds possessed was very useful; it was highly strategic for Kurds 
themselves and made them able to improve their regional position by having their 
enemies as their friends. 
A. Espionage for the Sultan  
Several other Kurds, whose spying activity as self-governing Kurdish spies is a clear 
and related matter, should also be mentioned. The events related to Chāldirān where 
the Ottoman campaign was launched by Selîm I against Ismā‘īl I, on the 23 Muḥar-
ram 920/20 March 1514, should be regarded as a basic point for those Kurds who 
played a significant role in the espionage for Ottomans.  
Early 16th Century 
As a first step in the study of early 16th-century Kurdish spies who served Ottoman 
emperors, the name of Rustam Bayg of Mukrī or Rustam b. Bābā ‘Umar should be 
mentioned. Apart from the ambiguous and very short account of him presented by 
Sharaf Khān (see Scheref 1860, Vol. I, p. 290), there is mention of him in the Otto-
man münşe’ât, where clear references are made to his spying activities.  
 The language of the letter makes it clear that Shiite movements were making 
progress in Ottoman lands and that Kurds gathered strategic intelligence for the Otto-
mans regarding the religious climate of the area. In a letter dated Rabī‘ II 908/Octo-
ber 1502, which Rustam Bayg wrote in response to Bâyezîd II’s inquiry about the 
Āq-Quyūnlū, he indicates that the Safavids were preparing military equipment to be 
used against the Āq-Quyūnlū. The Safavids were expected to sign a peace treaty with 
the Charkas in Egypt, referring also to the massacre of Purnāks in Baghdad. The evi-
dence indicates that Mukrīs also took a fierce polemical stand against early Safavid 
religious proclamations (see Ferîdûn Beg 1858, Vol. I, pp. 353–354; Thābitīyān 1964, 
p. 82; Nawā’ī 1977, pp. 710–711).  
 As the second important early Kurdish spy who was the ally of the Ottomans, 
one may note Mīr Sayyidī of Sōrān. He was an outstanding frontier agent for Selîm I, 
running a great network of spies in Safavid territories. According to a letter written 
by Mīr Sayyidī (dated c. 920/1514–1515), his spies had positions within the army of 
Ismā‘īl I, especially during the Safavid campaign at Mount Lāchīn. It is interesting 
that many detailed facts are provided on the Safavid military situation and what hap-
pened during that particular battle. A unique theme introduced here is the captivity of 
Mīr Sayyidī’s spies who had presented themselves as Dhu al-Qadr’s spies. Should 
this professed allegiance to Dhu al-Qadr rather than the Safavid Shah be understood 
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as a reaction to Ismā‘īl I’s harsh treatment of the Kurds, or as a strategic response to 
their interrogators who may have shown tolerance towards the Dhulqadrs? (See Fekete 
1977, p. 320.) 
 Mention should also be made of Shāh-‘Alī Bayg of Jazīra. He shows a very 
dynamic regional policy in which not only military Jazīran expeditions against the 
Safavids, but also spying activity become noticeable. From the letter he addressed to 
Qāsim Bayg11 (dated 924/1518–1519), it is clear that he provided very detailed re-
ports regarding Safavid troops (see Fekete 1977, p. 324).  
Late 16th Century  
The late 16th century often has a stronger sense of espionage identity among the 
Kurds. In the sources written after the middle of the century, there are more abundant 
references that connect Kurds with espionage for the sultan.  
 Among the late Kurdish spies relating to the Ottoman side was Ḥasan Bayg of 
Maḥmūdī. The details provided by Ottoman sources on the districts belonging to Ḥasan 
Bayg, far from his own hereditary principality (Dizyân, Pirgut, Misâfir, Mikon, Temil, 
Dingalan, Köpeklu and many other districts at Rabat, in Qulp), show a very extensive 
Kurdish area under the control of the Maḥmūdī emir. He was also capable of control-
ling or at least having influence over key parts of Persian Kurdistan.12 He was linked, 
for instance, with tribal chieftains on both the western and the eastern sides of the 
boundary, which helped him become a major representative of pro-Ottoman Kurdish 
espionage. The espionage role played by Ḥasan Bayg, mentioned in MD 21, khm. 
660, would have to be interpreted rather uniquely. While there is no characteristic of 
Ḥasan Bayg to be found in this document, there is a clear stress on this Maḥmūdī 
emir as an Ottoman agent involved in espionage issues against the Safavids. 
 Jamshīd Bayg of Pālu is also mentioned as a pro-Ottoman Kurdish spy. 
Whereas Sharaf Khān typically devoted little attention to intelligence issues, in his 
description of Jamshīd Bayg there are some allusions to these activities. Jamshīd 
Bayg was consulted several times by Sultan Süleymân I and his commanders through-
out the course of the Ottoman campaigns against Persia. Ottoman officials must have 
been highly impressed with Jamshīd Bayg’s spying activities, as he was one of the 
main advisers to Süleymân I during the eastern campaigns (cf. Scheref 1860, Vol. I, 
pp. 184–185).13 It is interesting that Jamshīd Bayg’s family inherited a great deal of 
Pālu espionage heritage. According to MD 38, khm. 376 (dated 7 Jumādā II 987/10 
 
11 It is hard to identify Qāsim Bayg. Possibly the reference is to Zulkadir Şahsüvaroğlı 
Kasım, the Ottoman sancakbey of Sultanönü. See Aköz – Solak (2004, pp. 9–29).  
12 See, for example, Rūmlū (2005, Vol. III, pp. 1327–1328); Qumī (1980, Vol. I, pp. 336, 
352); Peçevî (1968, Vol. II, pp. 294, 326); BOA MD 12, khm. 1129; MD 25, khm. 666; MD 32, 
khm. 37, 390, 658, 660; MD 49, khm. 76; MD 70, 310; MD 86, 26; MD 87, khm. 397; BOA 
A.DVN.MHM 32, 67; TD 97, 1ff.; and Bizbirlik (1993, p. 144). 
13 According to KK 1764, 126; BOA MD 2, khm. 43, 537; MD 3, khm. 336, 770; and MD 
6, 769, it is possible to say that Jamshīd Bayg died in Shawwāl 975/April 1568. 
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August 1579), the Ottomans ordered Yūsuf Bayg, a grandson of Jamshīd Bayg, to 
gather intelligence from the Safavid territories. 
 A single archival document provides us some information on Murād Bayg of 
Suwaydī, his military responsibilities, and the role he played in the espionage for the 
sultan. On 15 Shawwāl 973/14 May 1566, Süleymân I managed to secure the tribal 
and boundary affairs via Murād Bayg and gave him reinforcement. It is clear that he 
had utilised Turkish military groups with the assistance of Kurdish irregulars, amongst 
which were unnamed Suwaydī officials. Although it can be interpreted mainly as an 
Ottoman attempt to unite the regional tribes against the Safavids, yet the Sultan had 
also ordered him to care for the Ottoman border lines with Iran. His duty was to 
monitor the treatment of Kurdish tribes working for the Safavids who were involved 
in various frontier struggles with Kurdish tribes working for the Ottoman side (see 
BOA A.DVN.MHM 5, khm. 1563).  
 Another important late 16th-century Kurdish spy, often in the service of the 
Ottoman sultan, is Ṣāru Khān Bayg of Ḥazzo. To be sure, the espionage phase of his 
political career was rather significant. There is no clear evidence that the Sultan relied 
on Ṣāru Khān Bayg, but he was one of the Kurdish emirs in contact with the gov-
ernor of Vān (see MD 32, khm. 67, dated 20 Sha‘bān 985/11 November 1577).  
An account of Ṣāru Khān Bayg’s mission is also found in MD 38, khm. 376 (dated 7 
Jumādā II 987/10 August 1579). Because of Ḥazzo’s strategic importance as a fron-
tier district, the Ottoman Sultan ordered Ṣāru Khān Bayg, as the emir of Ḥazzo, to 
gather information on the Safavids. This figure appears to be the same Ṣāru Khān 
Bayg (described as Hazzo hâkimine) for whom the imperial scribes produced a stan-
dard copy (bir sureti) of espionage orders.  
 However, the leading Kurdish spy of the late 16th century is Zaynal Bayg of 
Ḥakkārī. As stated above, when Zaynal Bayg, as an Ottoman agent, was dispatched 
to the Safavid borders, his brother Bāyindir Bayg was in the Shah’s service and pre-
cisely on a similar espionage mission. This first intelligence mission played an essen-
tial role in the promotion of Zaynal Bayg. After a fierce battle (c. 959/1552), Zaynal 
Bayg killed his brother and imprisoned his companions. The reward of this proof of 
loyalty to the Ottomans was Zaynal Bayg’s appointment over Ḥakkārī  (see Scheref 
1860, Vol. I, pp. 101–102). 
 There is some evidence that Zaynal Bayg continued to work in information-
gathering very possibly till the end of his rule. The extensive border regions of Ḥakkārī 
were characterised by a concentration of settlements around Safavid checkpoints and 
fortresses. The descriptions by the spies of Zaynal Bayg in the lowlands surrounded 
by the Safavid villages were very helpful in forming successful Ottoman military ex-
peditions. As Zaynal Bayg (d. 993/1585 or 994/1586)14 was the most influential Kurd-
ish spy, it is appropriate to quote here a few sentences crucially relevant to the final 
stages of this essay. 
 
14 For these dates, see Scheref (1860, Vol. I, pp. 102–103) and Qumī (1980, Vol. II, p. 778), 
respectively.  
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 A significant knowledge of Zaynal Bayg’s spying activity is to be gained from 
the MD 14, khm. 756 (dated 28 Jumādā II 978/27 November 1570). The following 
may serve as the key sentence of this order:  
…Yukaru Canib’den gelen casusun haberi hususu sıhhat üzre malum 
olmak için Zeynel dame azzehu’ya mektup gönderüp ol dahi Ağahan nam 
âdemin ol canibe gönderüp cem’i ahval ve etvarlarına vâkıf olup…  
‘…in order to measure the accuracy of information reported by a spy 
who recently came back from Iran, a letter has been sent to Zaynal 
Bayg, may his glory endure, who also sent his own spy named Āghā 
Khān to Iran; the latter gathered accurate information on their affairs 
and happenings…’.  
Due to the order of Vān governor, Zaynal Bayg sent Āghā Khān to Iran who success-
fully gathered Safavid information and came back to Ḥakkārī. It seems that when 
some pieces of information were suspect, especially when being spread for disinfor-
mation purposes,15 the Ottomans turned directly to Zaynal Bayg’s mastery of espio-
nage for confirmation, without trusting their own Turkish spies. 
 The document MD 29, khm. 81 (dated Shawwāl 984/December 1576) summa-
rises what the Ottoman spies gathered from Iran regarding the Safavid Shah who was 
preparing for a new campaign against Baghdad. In his letter to the governors of Erzu-
rum, Baghdad, Shahrazur, Dīyār Bakr, Vān, and Ḥasan Bayg of Maḥmūdī, the Sultan 
made them aware of the Safavid threats. It is here ordered to Zaynal Bayg to be pre-
pared for immediate military response to the Safavids and especially to use his ex-
perienced men in the Safavid Empire in order to obtain information.  
 Some very interesting details about the spying activities of Zaynal Bayg are 
provided in MD 33 khm. 438 (dated 8 Dhu al-Qa‘da 985/20 January 1578). Here the 
Sultan ordered all Ottoman kadis along the long way from Ḥakkārī to Istanbul to sup-
port Zaynal Bayg. He emphasises that since the reign of Süleymân I and by order of 
that great emperor an imperial permission was granted to Zaynal Bayg in order to pass 
information on the Safavids to the Porte. “Then, the Sultan, continues, it is necessary 
for you to give permission to the men of Zaynal Bayg, open all the ways for them, 
and change their horses so that they be able to reach Istanbul easily.”16 It is clear that 
this order was addressed to the Ottoman kadis after Zaynal Bayg had complained 
against them. According to BOA KK 210, 145 (dated 20 Jumādā I 960/4 May 1553), 
Istanbul even began to be used for Zaynal Bayg’s espionage communication from a 
much earlier period, while the majority of other Kurdish emirs explicitly provided 
 
15 This espionage tactics is occasionaly mentioned in the available Ottoman–Safavid re-
sources. Traces of the disinformation tactics, for example, are included in Muḥammad ‘Ārif b. Mu-
ḥammad Sharīf Ispanaqchīpāshāzāda (2000, pp. 162–163). 
16 It is easy to understand the reason for Kadis’ concern. A method of Ottoman counter-in-
telligence was to close the borders with a state with which the Ottomans were in war. Any easy ac-
cess to the capital was very dangerous. Travellers had to prove their identity as enemy spies tried to 
conceal their identities by travelling in disguise (see Gürkan 2012a, pp. 5–6). It should be mentioned 
that the counter-intelligence was a very old method used by Muslim countries and not a 16th-century 
development (see Kātib 1954, p. 193). 
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their espionage reports for the Ottoman regional representatives, especially those in 
Baghdad, Vān and Erzurum.  
 Fully aware of the previous significant espionage services of Zaynal Bayg, the 
Ottoman Sultan has put emphasis on encouraging Zaynal Bayg so as to provide all 
the necessary intelligence on the Safavids (see MD 38, khm. 376, dated 7 Jumādā II 
987/1 August 1579). The Sultan ordered Zaynal Bayg to consult the Ottoman 
neighbouring governor and placed more emphasis on the imperial gifts which would 
be distributed to him. From another order addressed by the Sultan to Zaynal Bayg 
(see MD 46 khm. 276, dated 13 Ramaḍān 989/11 October 1581), it is evident that the 
powerful Ḥakkārī emir had allied his capable espionage network with the Ottomans. 
As a result of his good espionage services, the Sultan has used gifts as means of pro-
moting his situation. There is a single last sentence which alludes to the Ottoman 
continual encouragement to keep continual espionage on Iran; this can be thought to 
be the main goal of the Sultan’s letter. 
B. Espionage for the Shah 
In comparison to Kurdish spies acted as Ottoman agents, the Safavids were somewhat 
unable to turn more number of Kurdish spies into Persian assets. As stated above, the 
Kurdish Sunnism was the main reason which normally made more Kurds the focus 
of Ottomans. This does not necessarily mean that the Safavids had no access to any 
Kurdish spies. In addition to those mentioned in the previous pages, especially the 
Kurdish emir Şevket Bayg who was killed by Süleymân I for spying for the Safavids, 
there are some other important ones, too.  
 The first one is Ḥājjī Rustam Bayg of Chamishgazak. It is clear that Ḥājjī 
Rustam had a long-standing desire of an alliance with the Safavids, as evidenced by 
his fighting alongside the Safavids in the battle of Chāldirān. The conversion of a 
Chamishgazak prince to Shiite Islam is unsurprising when considering the pro-Alevi 
feelings of the Kurdish population of Chamishgazak.  
 Despite the fact that Ḥājjī Rustam Bayg paid homage to the Ottomans after the 
Safavids were defeated at Chāldirān, Selîm I had him executed. He was certainly not 
a proponent of peaceful coexistence with the Ottomans, although he was obliged to 
recognise their impactful victory over Safavids. What was Selîm I’s objective in mur-
dering him? It appears that Ḥājjī Rustam Bayg understood the Ottomans’ superiority 
to all other regional powers at the time, but the disgust of Selîm I for him was in-
spired firstly by his spying activities. It is clear from the archival documents that the 
Ottomans were aware that Ḥājjī Rustam Bayg was two-faced, serving both the Otto-
mans and the Safavids simultaneously. It is certain that he had intensified his secret 
contacts with the Safavids of which there was awareness on the part of Ottoman 
counter-intelligence (see TSMA E. 6672; E. 11839). This may have been one of the 
key reasons why Selîm I killed him on 2 Rajab 920/1 September 1514 (see Bacqué-
Grammont 1987, pp. 174–175; 1992, p. 714, note 29). 
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 The scarcely known father and son pair, Sayyid Muḥammad and Ya‘qūb Bayg 
of Ḥakkārī, are also the pro-Safavid Kurdish spies. They temporarily adopted the 
Safavid superiority, perhaps to differentiate themselves from the more prevalent 
Ottoman trends in the principality, and also possibly to avoid a secondary role in the 
political scene of the area. Both father and son were of crucial importance to the es-
pionage service. There is a letter from Ṭahmāsp I (dated Rajab 957/July–August 
1550) addressed to Sayyid Muḥammad in which the Shah persuaded Sayyid Muḥam-
mad to be a Safavid emir and to spy on the Ottomans. Ṭahmāsp I emphasised that 
Sayyid Muḥammad had previously dispatched his representative to Qazwīn and paid 
homage to the Shah (see Fekete 1977, p. 402, based on TSMA E. 8352). 
 A feature of the interaction between the Safavids and the Ḥakkārī Kurds is re-
vealed in a second letter (dated Rajab 957/July–August 1550) addressed to the son of 
Sayyid Muḥammad from the Shah. Here it is recounted what happened between him 
and his father, and then he is greatly encouraged to gather any important information 
on the Ottoman territories and to deliver it in detail to the Safavid Shah (see Fekete 
1977, p. 406, based on TSMA E. 8930).  
C. Double Agents  
It is true that several Kurdish agents penetrated into the Ottoman or Safavid Empires 
and sent reports to their employers. The best example of this is the networks that the 
Kurdish spies established in frontier areas from the 1520s onwards. Yet, the efficiency 
of these networks is sometimes a matter of debate. Both the Ottomans and the Safa-
vids were partly aware of the activities of these networks and may have intended to 
use them as double agents. For instance, it is clear that Safavids tried to employ some 
Kurdish agents as the middlemen between the Safavids and the Kurdish espionage 
networks. In one case, there is an interesting allusion to one of the attendants of Zay-
nal Bayg. Whatever the case, the Ottoman spy, named Āghā, provided a detailed re-
port in which, among other things, it is indicated that a certain man of Zaynal Bayg, 
named Ḥusayn, was trying to bring Kurdish emirs and the Safavid Shah together. 
From the author’s languge, it seems wise to accept also Safavid counter-intelligence 
policy and their collaboration with those Ḥakkārī Kurds who were close to Zaynal 
Bayg (see MD 32 khm. 67, dated 20 Sha‘bān 985/2 November 1577). 
 The most famous Kurdish double agent is Amīr Dā’ūd of Khīzān. Amīr Dā’ūd 
had a network of Kurdish spies operating in the Ottoman–Safavid border lands. He 
and his coterie worked for both the Ottoman and the Safavid authorities. It is possible 
to categorise Amīr Dā’ūd as a Kurdish emir who was himself involved in espionage. 
He personally engaged in espionage and also directed and supervised the activities of 
his network of Kurdish spies (see TSMA E. 6627/1; E. 8283; E. 8333). 
 Amīr Dā’ūd was not entirely faithful to the Ottomans. Unlike Sharaf Khān, 
who concealed details of the political contacts of the Kurds with Ismā‘īl I, perhaps in 
order to put a stop to the Ottomans’ severe policies against the Kurds at a time when 
he was trying to lead Kurdish chiefs to the Ottoman side, Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa was 
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perfectly frank with the Sultan. According to him, while Amīr Dā’ūd declared loyalty 
to the Ottoman Sultan, he was secretly in contact with Ismā‘īl I and reported Otto-
man military plans to the Safavids. We also know that he was one of those Kurdish 
emirs who spied for the Ottomans as well. When Ismā‘īl I moved to the Alādāgh 
summer pastures (north of Chāldirān), Amīr Dā’ūd dispatched his experienced spy, 
Mevlana Mehmed, to Tabrīz where he stayed for twenty-five days. When Amīr 
Dā’ūd’s spy became aware of the Ūzbek invasion to Khurāsān, he decided to go to 
the new encampment of the Shah at the Ūjān summer pastures (southeast of Tabrīz) 
in order to confirm the accuracy of the information. He managed to get close access 
to the Shah, from whom he obtained particularly accurate and reliable information. 
Mevlana Mehmed spent five days in the encampment of the Shah, and then he left 
Ūjān for Khīzān where he gave his report to Amīr Dā’ūd (see Ebû-l-Faẓl n.d., fols 
30r–30v; TSMA E. 6627/1; Hoca Se‘dü-ddîn 1862, Vol. I, pp. 307, 309, 317, 320). 
 Ḥasan Bayg of ‘Amādīyya was also a spy for both the Ottomans and the Safa-
vids. After the Āq-Quyūnlū decline, Ḥasan Bayg paid homage to the Safavids. As a 
commander in the battle against Amīr Bayg Mawṣillū, he is also reported to have 
maintained good relations with the Ottomans (see TSMA E. 8333/1–2; Hoca Se‘dü-
ddîn 1862, p. 300). These interpretations can be simply based on the Kurdish frontier 
policy which was interested in both the Safavids and the Ottomans. But a reasonable 
explanation may also put Ḥasan Bayg in the circle of the double agents. 
 On 2 Sha‘bān 922/9 September 1516 Ḥasan Bayg addressed a letter to Bıyıklı 
Mehmed Paşa, providing detailed information on the Safavid situation and the move-
ments of the Shah. Two Kurdish spies in his service, Bayrâm and Şâhsüvâr, were 
tasked with providing strategic information on the Safavids (see TSMA E. 6627/1;  
E. 8318; Bacqué-Grammont – Adle 1982, pp. 29–37; Bacqué-Grammont 1991, p. 
244). According to Kanuni Sultan Süleymân Döneminde Ait İnamat Defteri, KK 
1764, 78, Ḥasan Bayg received a bonus from the Ottoman Sultan in Rabī‘ I 938/No-
vember 1531 while he was still the mīr of ‘Amādīyya. 
 Finally, mention should be made of Pīr Ḥusayn Bayg of Chamishgazak. 
According to the reports of Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa, Pīr Ḥusayn Bayg had maintained 
his contacts with Ismā‘īl I despite having declared loyalty to the Ottoman Sultan. It is 
certain that Pīr Ḥusayn Bayg was a very active spy and provided the details of the 
Ottoman military operations to the Shah. It should be mentioned that a great deal of 
information came from operatives in the province of Chamishgazak. The Ottomans 
had to develop counter-intelligence practices for coping with such principalities, 
which shared Shiite trends with their Safavid enemies. Pīr Ḥusayn Bayg had strug-
gled against the Safavids and played an essential role in the defeat of Qara Khān, but 
Bıyıklı Mehmed Paşa was correct in claiming that he was a double agent (see TSMA 
E. 3296; E. 4256; E. 6627; E. 8283; TD 64, 852; Ebû-l-Faẓl n.d., fols 25r–25v, 30r–
30v; Ünal 1999, pp. 2, 36–37).  
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VI. Appendix 
In the following pages three unpublished documents are presented. The Ottoman or-
ders dealing with espionage have a standard formula. The documents presented here 
try to reflect various kinds of material, not exclusively the ‘orders’ provided by Mü-
himme Defters. 
A. Post-regional Spy 
The first document (TSMA D. 00749) includes a brief list of Ottoman Kurdish spies 
who played their espionage role in Egypt and the Levant. The document reproduced 
here indicates that the employment of Kurdish spies was a well-organised Ottoman 
policy. As stated above, this was almost precisely the method to help also the Safa-
vids in spying the north-eastern districts of Iran.  
 Because of the archaic and less standardised form of Āmid (Kara Hamid), it is 
possible to assign early 16th century to the document. Besides the typological evi-
dences, we have also a mention of the Ottoman general and administrator Bıyıklı 
Mehmed Paşa (d. 24 Muḥarram 928/24 December 1521) as the beylerbeyi of Dīyār 
Bakr (esp. fol. 5v). This reflects a dating from Rabī‘ II 922/May 1516 to Muḥarram 
928/24 December 1521.  
Text 
 
Figure 1. TSMA D. 00749 
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Be hıdmet-i casûsî ferestâde 
 
Musa 
Kürd 
Mısır’dan gitti 
8 
İki ’ulûfesi hizânede bâkî 
Murad 
Kürd 
Mısır’dan gitti 
15 
İki ’ulûfe hizânede bâkî 
Ebubekir 
Kürd 
8 
 
Bali Ahmed 
12 
Urdı 
10 
Muhammed 
Han Ahmed 
10 
Hacı Kara Ahmed 
10 
 
Yekûn yedi nefer  
 
Zikr olan dört nefer Şâm’dan irsâl olundu; ’ulûfeleri Kara Hamid mukataasından 
havâle olundı. 
Translation 
[Those who were] sent to the espionage service 
 
Musa 
the Kurd 
Dispatched from Egypt 
8 
His two ulufes17 remained 
in the imperial treasure  
Murad 
the Kurd 
Dispatched from Egypt 
15 
His two ulufes remained 
in the imperial treasure  
Ebubekir 
the Kurd 
8 
 
Bali Ahmed 
12 
Urdı 
10 
Muhammed 
Han Ahmed 
10 
Hacı Kara Ahmed 
10 
 
Total 7 individuals  
 
Four of above-mentioned individuals have been dispatched from Syria; their ulufes 
were assigned from the muqāṭa‘a18 of Kara Hamid.  
 
17 This term indicates the wages of the soldiers, or the wage of a soldier in by-gone days.  
18 This indicates a branch of the public revenue.  
 
218 MUSTAFA DEHQAN – VURAL GENÇ 
Acta Orient. Hung. 71, 2018 
B. When Spy Meets Spy  
Sometimes Kurds themselves were subjects of the espionage, especially when they 
hold a frontier or political position in the rival empire. The manuscript of the Persian 
collection of Jāmī (n.d.), Ash‘at al-Luma‘āt (No. 10557/4, fols 77r–78r), contains a 
Turkish letter. It is reasonable that this letter, which includes references to both Sulṭān 
Ḥusayn Bayg and Ḥājji Bayg of Dunbulī, the contemporaries of Süleymân I, dates 
from the period prior to 974/1566 or much earlier (i.e. 939/1533), when the Ottoman 
Empire was still in the process of establishing a great campaign against Iran.  
 Although the preserved linguistic differences ascribed to a spy from the east-
ern (or Safavid) Turkish communities may not be problem to doubt that the spy was 
an employee of Süleymân I and he was used as a local spy, the context raises the pos-
sibility of there having been some relations between the spy and Dunbulī Kurds,  
a family of the Kurdish Imāmī Shī‘as who were instrumental in the propagation of 
Shiism in Ādharbāyjān, especially around Sögman-Ābād, the hereditary fief of Dun-
bulī to the north-west of Khuy19. There are intimations in the name of ‘Alī of a pos-
sible Shī‘a origin of the spy. The name implies a religious connection with Ḥājjī 
Bayg, a symbol of Safavid power in some parts of Ādharbāyjān where the purport of 
the community was some linguistic and especially religious differeneces with the 
western Ottoman regions. Moreover, there are panegyrical phrases in which our un-
known spy praises the powerful troops of Ṭahmāsp I, his wealth, his good behaviour, 
and the military power which no Sultan was able to challenge. Regarding the Safavid 
soldiers, it is interesting that the spy in question emphasises their pledge of faith in 
Islam, religious law, prayer, and fast. In his view, the well-known sayings about the 
Qizilbāsh are merely accusations. 
 It is possible that the Safavids themselves did in fact provide such a kind of 
espionage account as ‘disinformation’, repenting Süleymân I to take a military expe-
dition against Iran. It is impossible to accept all political propaganda and panegyrical 
statements mentioned in the text. That our spy characterised Ṭahmāsp I as an open-
handed or generous spirit, for example, is completely baseless because his character 
was indeed marked by miserliness and grasping meanness (see Qumī 1980, Vol. I, 
pp. 610–614; Scheref 1862, Vol. II, pp. 251–252). 
Text 
[77r] Sevâd-ı Mektûbi ki Câsûs-ı Hundgâr-ı Rûm be Efendi-yi Rûm Kalemi Nimûde 
dar Sâli ki ’Ali-câh Hacı Beg Dunbulî be Ka’be-yi Mu’azzama Refte Bude 
 
Sa’adetlü ve ’izzetlü ve mürüvvetlü, şecâ’atlü, ifâdatlu, ifâzatlu efendimiz Hüseyin 
Hân Beg voyvoda-i müeyyed zîde kadruhu hisselerine dürer-i da’vât-ı vâfiyât ve 
gurer-i  teslîmât-ı  zâkiyât  iblâğ  ve  irsâl  olundukdañ  sonra  ma’lûm-ı  hâtır-ı  deryâ- 
 
19 They were converted from Yezidism to Shiism many years before the rule of Ḥājjī Bayg 
(see Scheref 1860, Vol. I, pp. 310, 312).  
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Figure 2. Majlis, No. 105574, fol. 77r 
mekâtır ve mezkûr-ı zamîr-i münîr-i mihr-tenvîrî olundu ki eğer taraf-ı ihlâs-ı 
kenefimiz de sorulsa lillahilhamd vücûd-ı nâbûdumuz ecyâller silkinde mevcûd ve 
eskâm-ı kedûrât-ı cismânîndeñ Allah tebârek ve teâlanıñ hısn-ı hırâsetinde mev’ûd. 
Ümîdimiz Allah Teâlâ cenâbından oldur ki vücûd-ı bâ-cûd-ı mürüvvet-mevdûduñuz 
daimâ âfitâb-ı ‘alem-tâbnıñ devlet semâsında münevver ve sıhhat-i meclisînde 
musaddar ola. Âmin ya Rabbü’l-’Alemîn.  
 Benim efendim mektûb-ı meveddet-üslûb-ı şerîfiñiz ahsen ezmine ve evkâtte 
şeref-i vusûl bulub mezâmîn-i lutf-ayînindeñ ma’lûm olundı ki hâtır-ı ’âtırıñız Rûm’da 
vâk’i olan bu sene ahvâlleriniñ istimâ’ olunmağına ve ıttılâ’ bulunmağına râğıbdur. 
Lihezâ ’arzuhâl tarîkiyle musaddi’ olunur ki bundan akdem mezkûr olanınıñ ihbârât 
budur ki: 
 Sa’âdetlü ve devletlü Hundgâr hazretleri Beyaz Efendi tahrîki ile ’âzım-ı gazâ-
yı İran ve mezkûr efendi takrîr kılan ’acz-ı ahvâl-i Kızılbaş bu sene-i mübârekede 
Allah lütfu ile ve İmam Ali aleyhisselâm i’câzı ile kendüsiniñ imam olan Abdullah 
Cezâyirî bir hoşça mektûb mucebince tahvîf kılub ve kesret-i sipâh-ı hadem ü haşem 
sa’âdetlü ’Acem şâhı halledallahu mülkuhu ebeden takrîr ve tahrîr kılmağla zâhiren 
kendü söyledigindeñ peşîmân ve belki bu şöhretindeñ be-gayet hırâsân ve mezkûr 
olanınıñ mektûb-ı bedâyi’-’ibârâta muhtevî ve garâyib elfâza menût elsine ve efvâhda 
sâir ve ekser beyâz ve sefâinde münderic. Lihezâ lâzım göründi ki hıdmet-i şerîfiñize 
tahrîr ve mersûl oluna. 
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Figure 3. Majlis, No. 105574, fols 77v–78r 
 Sa’âdetlü ve devletlü e’ani bihâr-ı ’ulûm gavvâsı ve lügat-i fazl ma’nası ifadet 
bezmiñde serîr-i ârâ ve ifâzat ikliminde cihân-peymâ kıdvetü’l-muhakkikîn ve 
imâmü’s-sâlikîn câmi’ü’l-birr ve’l-yakîn ve sâlik-i turuk-ı Hulefâ-yı Râşidîn 
efendimiz, dame eyyame irşâdihi ve hidâyetihi, hazretlerine selâmlardan sonra 
’arzuhâl ider ki eğer hâtır-ı hûrşîd-eseriñiz istimâ’-ı ahvâl-i huccâca ve mezkûr 
olanınıñ [77v] kimseye rağıb itse ma’lûm-ı şerîfiñiz ola ki işbu sene-i mübârekede 
tavâf-ı Beytullahi’l-Harâm ve ziyâret-i ravza-i seyyidü’l-enâm aleyhi’s-salavâtullahi’l-
meliki’l-’âllâme ’âzım olan ’Acem huccâcı ara mezkûr olanıñ ’Acem pâdişâhınıñ 
kölesi ve yallusı dimekle maruf Hacı Beg Dunbulî hazretleri bir ’acîb ’uzmet ve 
şevket ve ceberût ve haşmet ile vârid ve birkaç haşr-ı kıyâmet-eser ki hergiz Âl-i 
Osman’da ve belki hiç ezmine ve eyyâmda görülmemiş hıdmetine meşgûl ve emîr-i 
hac hazretine erişdikde köleleri cenbinde görünmez oldı ve şerîf-i Mekke olan bî-
’akıbet karakulları içre bulunmaz olunmaz oldı ve bir dürlü20 sâz sadâ-yı ’acîb ile ve 
nevâ-yı garîb ile bincek ve incek zamanda söylüyor ki Sûr-i İsrafildeñ dem urur. 
Elhak sofra-yı nevâle ve hân-ı keremi ile Kabe vadisi ki nâr-ı Nemrûd’dañ işitdigin 
guya “kulnâ yâ nâru kûnî berden ve selâmen ’alâ İbrahim”21 olub ve belki ravazât-ı 
 
20 Text spells dürlür. It was emended to dürlü.  
21 Qur’ān 21/69.  
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naîm kılıb ve cemi’an köleleri ve ’asâkiri heb meş’erler22 giyinmiş, meş’aller 
takınmış ve meş’aller kayınmış. Hakka ki bincek zamanda ’asâkiriniñ yankusundañ 
hayret gözi hîre ve sehâ ve keremlerindeñ akıl tîre olur. Ve bir edna kölesi ve çâkeri 
altunı akçe şebîh ihsân ider ve hân-ı nevâle yeyilecek zamanda cem’i hüccâbı ve 
çavuşları hıdmetlerindeñ kenara kılub havâss ve a’vâm, belki kâfe-i enâma salât-ı 
hakk ale’t-tezyîd erişdirirler ve aye-i kerîme mazmûnuna sâdık “bi fakihetin ve 
lahmin tayr mimma yeştehun”23 ve şöyle ki ’Acem şairi söyler “her çi endişe der 
goman averd, matbahi poht ve der miyan24 averd”25.  
 Sofralar, ara çekilür ve yüz türlü ’acâyib ve garâyib tatlu ve tazlu şeyler ki 
iştihâ-yı tabbâhı zabtına ve tabhına aciz ve bâdiye ’Arabları ki hergiz sencekdeñ26 
gayrı bir şey görmemişler işte şeker ile yapulmış et’ime-i elvân [78r] ve sürme ile 
tokunmış kafdan yicek ve kullanacak zamanda bir dürlü şenlik ve şa’af iderler ki âb u 
’alafdañ gümrâh olanıñ ta’bire müyessere olmaya.  
 Ve ben kulun seyr-i ’azmine serâ-perde-i temkîn tarafına güzâr kılub aşhâne ve 
silâhhâne vesâir büyûtâtıña seyr ederken cenâbına ukraşıb ve ben kuluña manzûr-i 
nazar-ı iksir-eser kılıb kendü hazretine tâleb kılıb ve şeref-i selâm ’ala İbrahim 
müşerref olduktañ sonra kim olduğumu suâl edib kendü kim oluduğumu 
söylemedim. Müslüman suhtesi söyledim ve hân-ı nevâl ve ihsânından kaç kaç altun 
ve haftan [kaftan] ve tür türlü şeyler merhamet ve mekremet bulub ve efendime zâhir 
ola ki elsine ve efvâhda mezkûr olanıñ ve fırak-ı Kızılbaş’a isnâd virilen fevâhiş 
i’mâl ve kabâih ef’alindeñ hakka ki bu cem’i ara zahir olmaz ve salah ve seddâddañ 
gayri bu ’asker ara bir nesne bulunmaz ve cem’i ümemdeñ aslah ve ekser fırakdañ 
a’buddurlar. Eğleb evkâtleri ’ibâdete masrûf ve ekser saatleri tesbîhe ve tehlîle 
mevsûf. Hakka ki i’tikâdleri râsih ve ’azmleri musâlaha üzre cezm ve eğer şöyle haşr 
u ’asker ile ve bö[y]le direm ve kerem ile ne ’azm kılsalar makdûr ve karşu 
mukavemetlerine İslam ’askeri ma’zûr ve cem’i ’Arab itaatına ve fermânına muti’ ve 
münkâd ve belki ekser ehl-i Rûm ihsânına mu’tâd. Cenâbınıza mahfî kalmaya ki 
köleleri şöyle olan şâhıñ kendüsü ne denlü olsa gerek ve böyle sipâhıyla cidâl ne 
münâsib ve şöyle ’asker ile niz’a ne lâyık ve kesret-i isti’dâd-ı ’asâkirîn ta’dâd ve 
kerem ve sehâsının vasf olunsa mücellidât-ı tasnîf itmege lâyık ve hakka ki cem’i 
merâtib ta’rîfine fâik. İnşallahü’l-’aziz hıdmet-i şerîfe iricek zamanda mürûr-ı eyyâm 
ve duhûr-ı şuhûr ile ta’rîf ve tavsîf oluna. Recâ oluñur ki cenâb-ı rif’atiñiz Allahü 
Teâlâ emânında ola. Efendim27 bu evsâfa olan kiminiñ ismin ve resmin ve kim 
 
22 Reading is doubtful.  
23 Qur’ān 52/22, 56/21. 
24 Text spells zaman. 
25 The basic version of this poem will be found on nishastan-i Bahrām rūz-i Shanba dar 
gunbad-i sīyāh (Niẓāmī Ganjawī 2001, p. 163); here it runs as follows: har chi andīsha dar gumān 
āward ▪ maṭbakhī raft u dar mīyān āward.  
26 The reading sencek is doubtful. It is certainly a kind of food. Occasionally, sincik is used 
in Kurdish dialects of Eastern Anatolia to mean a kind of pastry.  
27 There is a little confusion here. By drawing a line through, the scribe canceled “kitabıñ 
bu muhlise irsâl idesiz ümiddir ki hakk zemânetinde”. It is superfluous.  
 
222 MUSTAFA DEHQAN – VURAL GENÇ 
Acta Orient. Hung. 71, 2018 
olduğun tahkîk buyurub i’lâm idesiz ve mir’atü’l-cemâle ma’rûf sâib kitâbetin bu 
muhlise irsâl idesiz. Ümîddir ki Hakk zemânetinde mahfûz kalasız. Sahh.28 
Translation 
A Copy of the Letter written by Khundgār-i Rūm’s Spy to the Rūm’s Efendi when the 
High Official Ḥājjī Bayg of Dunbulī went to the Great Mecca. 
 
After declaring and dispatching the pearls of abundant invocations and the gleams of 
pure greetings to the share of my prosperous, honourable, generous, brave, profit-
giver, and effusive master Ḥusayn Khān Bayg, the corroborative Voivode29, may his 
value increase, it became clear for his mind, as a drop in the sea, and it was remem-
bered by his shining and love-enlightener heart that if our sincerity would be ques-
tioned, our mortal existence, praise be to God, is present within the range of genera-
tions and promises of good protections by God, may He be blessed and exalted, 
against various bodily turbidities. We expect from His Excellency the God, exalted 
be He, that your generous and manliness-lovely existence permanently would be 
bright like a world-illuminating sun in the heavens of your government and would be 
sitting in front of [royal] assembly. Amen, Lord of the worlds.  
 Your Majesty, your cordial and honourable letter has been received at the best 
time and leisure. From its graceful contents it became clear that your fragrant mind is 
interested in hearing of and being informed about the events of Rūm in the present 
year. Therefore, the report, which is putting trouble to you, indicates that previous 
gathered information and runs as:  
 With the incitement of Beyaz Efendi, His Majesty Khundgār, the prosperous 
and fortunate, is dispatched for the holy war against Iran. [In order to draw attention 
to the holy war in Iran and accelerate it], the foregoing master had written a report on 
the weakness of Qizilbāsh. But in this holy year with the grace of God and miracle of 
Imam ‘Alī, upon whom be peace, his imām ‘Abd Allāh Jazāyirī30 frightened him well 
through a correspondance. Apparently he was regretted what he said when the great 
quantity of army of prosperous Persian Shah, may God make perpetual his sovereignty, 
 
28 This is the abbreviated form of sahih/sahi, meaning ‘it is finished, without any mistake’.  
29 This is a Slavic title, meaning literally ‘military governor’, or ‘warlord’. Under the Otto-
mans, voivode was the title borne by the ruler of a province, whose power included security and ad-
ministration. Gradually voivode used to indicate the governor of a province.  
30 The title imām and Jazāyirī remind us of ‘Alī b. Hilāl al-Jazā’irī, the ‘Āmilī imāmī Shiite 
scholar. It is interesting that Jazā’irī was a master of Muḥaqqiq al-Karakī who was a close imāmī 
scholar to Ismā‘īl I, especially from 910/1504–1505 onwards. During the reign of Ṭahmāsp I, he 
was still influential and helpful in defending early Safavid Shiism. For a variety of reasons and the 
text which here is in a clear script, it remains impossible to show whether the author provided a 
distortion: ‘Abd Allāh instead of ‘Alī. Or did the author only refer to another member of the same 
family? The name also reminds one of ‘Abd Allāh, father of the well-known Shiite scholar Sayyid 
Ni‘mat Allāh Jazā’irī (b. 1050/1640–1641). For details, see Raḥmatī (2012, pp. 44, 65, 92); Afandī 
Iṣfahānī (1981, Vol. I, p. 190; Vol. III, pp. 17, 148; Vol. V, pp. 108, 253–256).  
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was confirmed, and even he was extremely afraid because of this reputation. The pre-
sent letter which is composed of new phrases and strange words involves the afore-
mentioned events, being notorious in the mouths and normally is mentioned in the 
papers and note-books. Therefore, it was necessary to write and deliver it to your hon-
ourable presence.  
 After greetings to my prosperous and fortunate master, that is, the diver of the 
seas of sciences, meaning of the words of learning, occupier of the throne in the as-
sembly of education, traveller in the realm of effusion, leader of investigators, head 
of the disciples, owner of piety and certitude, and follower of the paths of Righteous 
Caliphs, may his reign of guidance and right way endure, [your servant] reports that: 
if your sun-alike mind is interested in hearing of the circumstances of pilgrims and 
the events occurred, it should be clear for your honourable [presence] that Persian 
pilgrims headed to the circumambulation of the garden of the Sacred House of God 
and to visit tomb of the Prophet Muḥammad, lord of the mankind, may God, the 
Owner and the King, send greetings to him, in this blessed year. Here is the account: 
with a huge crowd like doomsday crowd in his service, which neither seen in the Ot-
toman Empire nor even had seen in previous periods and cycles, the Persian mon-
arch’s servant and bondman, known as Majesty Ḥājjī Bayg of Dunbulī, having a 
great hauteur, power, pomp and glory, came to the side of His Excellency the Chief 
of Pilgrims where he was disappeared among his servants; and [here] Ḥājjī Bayg, the 
mortal sharīf of Mecca, disappeared among his guards. When they ride on and get 
off, they are playing a pearly instrument with a strange voice and unfamiliar tone, re-
sembling trumpet of Israfil. With the dining table of victuals and tablecloth of gen-
erosity, the Valley of Kaaba, in fact, became like an address to the fire of Nemrud, 
“we (Allāh) said: O fire! Be you coolness and safety for Ibrāhīm!” and even make 
the gardens of heaven. All of his servants and soldiers were clothed in meş’er.31  
In fact, everyone’s eyes are amazed because of his soldier’s echo at the riding time 
and the wisdom disappears in the darkness because of their munificence and generos-
ity. One of his lowest slaves and servants beneficently confers gold as akçe, keeping 
all doorkeepers and sergeants, the elites and the laymen, away from their services at 
the time of victuals eating; even all of the people increasingly deliver God’s prayer, 
according to the content of the verse of Qur’ān: “we shall provide them with fruit and 
meat of fowls as they desire”; the Persian poet says: “whatever the thought brought 
into assumption ▪ the cook baked it and presented it”.  
 They open tablecloths, including hundred kinds of wonderful and strange sweet 
and salty foods, for which the cook cannot control his appetite and remains incapable 
of cooking. The Bedouin Arabs who have seen nothing except sencek, have fun when 
they taste these colourful foods made of sugar. It is impossible to explain but at the 
time of eating they behave like animals, which get lost among the water and fodder, 
when they dress the mail made of silver thread.  
 
31 The translation is doubtful. meş’erler possibly comes from meş’er, ‘the sacred place of 
sacrifice in the ḥajj ceremonies’. Both reading and translation will be strengthened with the verb ‘to 
clothe’ (giyinmiş). The author means a kind of vestment with a distinct style.  
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 In order to continue his observation, this servant went to the side of imperial 
tent. He encountered His Excellency when he was observing the soup kitchen, ar-
mory and other premises. He looked at me with his elixirful look and requested me to 
come into his presence. After having been honoured with the honour of greetings to 
Ibrāhīm, he asked me who am I? I did not tell him who I am. I introduced myself to 
him as a Muslim suhte32. By way of favour and greatness, I was granted a few golden 
coins, mails and some kinds of things from his tablecloth of victuals and beneficence. 
It should be clear for my master that the spoken and oral mentions, regarding the 
shameful acts and obscene deeds ascribed to the sect of Qizilbāsh, are really not visi-
ble within the community. They do not have anything but righteousness and straight 
direction; they are the most pious [nation] of all nations and best worshipers of many 
number of sects. They mostly devote their times to worship and spend most of their 
hours with singing the praises of God and pronouncing the profession of God’s unity. 
In fact, their creed is stable and their decision tenaciously established on peace. With 
such a population, army, wealth, and generosity, they have access to whatever they 
like. The Muslim army would be incapable to resist them. All Arabs are under his 
obedience and obey and follow his decree; and even most of the people of Rūm are 
accustomed to his beneficence. It should not be hidden from you that if the slaves of 
the Shah are like that, how would be the Shah himself? It is not convenient to fight 
against his army; and it is not suitable to quarrel against such an army. It would be 
worthy to write several volumes if I mention various abilities and the number of his 
army, his greatness, and generosity. It should be indeed described as superior to all 
[military] ranks. If God the Mighty wills, it will be described and depicted day by 
day and month by month when I reach to your honourable service. I hope that your 
eminent majesty may be under the protection of God, exalted be He. My master! You 
may quest and indicate name, reputation, and identity of those who carry these char-
acteristics and send to this sincere servant your right correspondance, known as the 
mirror of beauty. I hope that you may be protected by God’s security. It is correct.  
C. Spy Disguised as Emir 
The last document (BOA MD 48, No. 311) is a letter addressed to the beylerbey of 
Vān. It is written on 15 Ramaḍān 990/3 October 1582. Here the Safavid commander 
Maqṣūd Bayg is mentioned as a person who swore an oath of loyalty to the Ottoman 
monarch. The beylerbey of Vān is asked to speak to the court whether Maqṣūd Bayg 
and other Persian officials were loyal to the Sultan.33 
 
32 suhte literally means ‘burned’, and refers to the students of law and theology.  
33 Maqṣūd Bayg can be identified as Maqṣūd Khān, a former Safavid official who took ref-
uge at the Ottoman court. He was later appointed a governor of Aleppo. In his Italian narrative, trans-
lated as The War between the Turks and the Persians, Giovanni Tomasso Minadoi (1548–1615) 
interestingly had consulted Maqṣūd Khān in order to collect Safavid information (see Matthee 
2014, pp. 5–6).  
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Text 
 
Figure 4. BOA MD 48, No. 311 
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Hasan Çavuş’a verilmiştir. Yazıldı. 
 
Van beglerbegine hüküm ki bundan akdem elçiliğin tarîkiyle südde-i sa’adetime 
gelen Maksûd, dâme izzuhu, hâlâ oğlu ile ’atabe-i ’ulyama gelüb kemâl-i ihlâs ve 
sadâkat ile kendü ve oğulları ve sair tevâbi’ ve levâhıkı izhâr-ı ihtisâs-ı ’ubudiyyet 
idüb pâye-i serîr-i hüsrevâneme rûy-mâl şerefiyle müşerref oldukda envâ’i ’inâyet-i 
şâhâneme mazhar-ı vâk’î olub ve Yukaru Cânib’in ahvâline ve Emîr Han’ın vesâir 
efrâd-ı ’âyânının itaatlerine ve Tebriz’in fethine müteallik bazı husûsu i’lâm itmeğin 
senin ve Hakkâri hâkimi Zeynel Beg ve Bitlis hâkimi Şeref Hân ve Mahmudî Hasan 
dâme ’uluvvihum marifetleriyle ’amel olunmak içün her birine ahkâm-ı şerîf ile 
müşârunileyh senin cânibine gönderülmek üzeredür. Bu husûsa sen mukaddem 
mukayyed olub, müşârunileyhim hâkimler ile haberleşüb dahi ahvâl neye müncer 
olur ise ’arz ve îsâl eylemek lâzım olunmağın buyurdum ki vusûl buldukta bu bâbda 
onat muteber olub müşârunileyhim ile vesâir beglerbegine müttefik olan ashâb-ı 
iyâlet ile ve serhad begleri vesâir ehl-i vukûf ile müşâvere eyleyüb eğer Emîr Han’ın 
eğer sâir Kızılbaş ümerâ ve ’âyânının ve bi’l-cümle kabâil ve ’aşâirinin keyfiyet-i 
ahvâllerin tam tecessüs eyleyüb, fi’l-vâk’i müşârunileyh Maksûd dâme izzuhunun 
davası üzre Kızılbaş hânlarının ve a’yânlarının ’atabe-i ’aliyye-i şâhâneme 
müracaatları ve itaata meyl ve rağbetleri var mıdır? Ahvâlleri ne yüzdendür? 
Tebriz’in zabtı ve fethi ne vecihle müyesserdür? Ne tedbîr ve ne tedârik lâzımdur? 
Anun gibi bi-’inâyetullahi Teâlâ fethi müyesser oldukda ne vecihle hıfz olunur? 
Daimâ meftûn ve mahfûz olması ne tarîkle mümkündür? Mukaddemce tahsîl-i ’ilm 
eyleyüb müşârunileyh varduğunda te’hîr lâzım gelmeyüb ne vecihle tedârik olunub 
ol cânibden ne makûle ahvâle ıttılâ’ tahsîl olunduğu ve re’yiniz neye olunduğun 
mufassal ve meşrûh ’ale’t-ta’cîl ulağımla südde-i saadetime ’arz eyleyüb ana göre bu 
cânibden dahi vakti ile iktiza ittüğü üzere tedârik ne ise göreler. Bu bâbda onat 
vechile teemmül idüb el-iyazubillahi Teâlâ ’izzet-i nâmûs-ı saltanata muğayir vâz’ 
sudûrundan ihtiyât idüb hiçbir husûsda musta’ib ve …34 komayub olan tarîkiyle olub 
anı dahi ’inâyetullahu Teâlâ neye müncer olacağının …35 idüb dahi sahih üzre yazub 
bildiresün.  
Translation 
It has been delivered to Hasan Çavuş. It has been written36.  
 
It is my order to the governor of Vān that Maqṣūd, may his glory endure, who had 
previously come to My Threshold of Felicity through your embassy, has now come 
to My sublime [court], submitted his obedience, and paid homage [to me] with his 
 
34 It was impossible to complete the reading. Here we probably have an alternative reading 
of musta’ib. 
35 The word is incomplete. Though the document preserves a bila, it is impossible to give 
any meaning of these defective words.  
36 yazıldı ‘it has been written’ indicates that a finished copy based on the draft was indeed 
sent.  
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sons, siblings, and retinue with most loyality and sincerity. When his face touched 
the base of My Imperial Throne and honoured with that, all kinds of My Imperial 
favours were bestowed upon him. He informed me of some matters including the cir-
cumstances of Iran, the obedience of Amīr Khān and his noble retinue, and the con-
quest of Tabrīz. The foregoing [Maqṣūd] is about to be dispatched to your side with 
My Honourable Imperial Orders to you and to the governor of Ḥakkārī, Zaynal Bayg, 
governor of Bidlīs, Sharaf Khān, and Ḥasan of Maḥmūdī, may their elevation endure. 
These Imperial Orders must be implemented by you and others. Be you careful of 
this subject and communicate with the foregoing governors. Moreover, it is necessary 
to inform us of what resulted. My command is that when My Noble Order arrives, do 
respect this subject properly and counsel with the foregoing governors, other gov-
ernors and their allies, consisting of administrators, frontier governors and well-
informed individuals. Do spy on Amīr Khān, Qizilbāsh governors, notables, and 
briefly their tribes and clans. Do Qizilbāsh governors and notables have in fact any 
inclination and trend to return and obey My Sublime Imperial Porte as asserted by 
the foregoing Maqṣūd, may his glory endure? How is their circumstance? Which way 
makes the confiscation and the conquest of Tabrīz possible? What kind of precaution 
and supplies do we need? If the conquest of Tabrīz, with the favour of God, exalted 
be He, is the case, how it can be retained? How is it possible to keep it permanently 
fascinated and protected? Primarily the information should be gathered. When the 
latter arrives it is unnecessary to delay; details of the provisions of that side (i.e. 
Iran), the kind and circumstance of the information gathered, and in order to take 
timely precaution, your detailed and comprehensive opinions on these issues should 
be promptly submitted to My Threshold of Felicity. Consider the necessary things in 
this regard; abstain from doing, God forbid, something against the excellence of the 
honour of the sultanate, leaving no shortcoming … in any matters; report the events 
with bare fact; write and inform us about the results … with the favour of God.  
VII. Conclusion 
While there are no extensive Turkish and Persian sources concerned exclusively with 
Kurdish spies, the field can be explored with the help of a number of unpublished Ot-
toman documents; there are only some very scanty related episodes in the chronicles 
of the time. The Kurds were able to use local potentials, and sometimes they were 
able to combine both Ottoman and Safavid interests.  
 It is somewhat hard to get a clear picture of Kurdish espionage activities in the 
political context of the area. But there can be little doubt that certain tactics were 
used by Kurdish emirs. Also it seems clear that secondary Kurdish spies (i.e. military 
and administrative officials, merchants, soldiers, pilgrims, tribal members, villagers, 
hawkers, etc.) were not more successful in carrying out this programme than were 
Kurdish emirs. The role played by Kurdish emirs was essentially a leadership role in 
Kurdish espionage networks extending along a vast Ottoman–Safavid frontier area.  
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 A more general conclusion can also be drawn from the above. Unlike the Otto-
man Empire’s success in using many Kurdish spies abroad, Safavid Iran had probably 
few Kurdish spies on Ottoman territory. There are a number of Turkish and Persian 
sources providing details of Safavid spying activities, but there is a considerable si-
lence on the Kurdish spies as Safavid agents. It does not mean, however, that Safavid 
intelligence did not have Kurdish spies in the Ottoman Empire. Much of the 16th-
century Kurdish principalities were under the control of the Ottomans. Compared to 
the Ottomans, the Safavids had a weaker presence in parts of the Kurdish lands; thus 
a fewer number of potential Kurdish spies were available to them. The Safavids, of 
course, were likely to use a different sort of spies: people who were religiously moti-
vated and found protection in heterodox communities still existing all over Anatolia. 
Abbreviations 
A.DVN.MHM – Bâb-ı Asafî, Divân-ı Hümâyûn Mühimme Kalemi  
BOA – Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi  
khm. – hüküm 
KK – Kâmil Kepeci Tesnifi 
MAD – Maliyeden Müdevver Defterler 
MD – Mühimme Defteri 
TD – Tahrir (Defter-i Hâkânî) Defteri  
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